Judges Lose Their Seats for Their “Dumankaya Decision”: A Stark Indication of a Compromised Judiciary
In a move that starkly illustrates the vulnerabilities of Turkey’s highest judicial echelons, the judges of the 3rd Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation have been stripped of their positions following their controversial decision to overturn the convictions of Dumankaya Holding executives and nullify the confiscation of their companies. This ruling, which critically examined the evidential basis of a FETÖ-related conviction—based solely on anonymous witness statements (“gizli tanık”)—has resulted in a swift and punitive reshuffling. It underscores a worrying reality: even the most senior judges are deprived of tenure and security, exposing them to immediate political retribution for upholding judicial principles.
The Case and Its Implications
The 3rd Chamber’s ruling not only invalidated prison sentences ranging from 6 to 7 years for Halit Dumankaya, Uğur Dumankaya, Semih Serhat Dumankaya, and Ayla Dumankaya Pirinççi, but also rejected the notion that the defendants’ business actions—such as transferring salaries to Bank Asya or collecting scholarship donations—were criminally motivated. This decision is especially significant given that this chamber reviews appeals in some of Turkey’s most pivotal cases, and its rulings have far-reaching implications across the nation’s judicial landscape.
Retaliation Against Judicial Independence
In response to the ruling, four sitting members of the chamber were abruptly reassigned, while nine new members were appointed from other courts. This drastic reshuffling is widely interpreted as deliberate retaliation aimed at suppressing dissenting judicial opinions, particularly in politically sensitive and high-stakes trials. Such punitive measures make clear that, in Turkey, no judge is immune—even those in senior positions—from facing immediate punitive action for decisions that challenge the prevailing political narrative.
State Intervention: A Calculated Power Play
Perhaps most alarming is the revelation of coordinated interference by the Presidency’s Office. In close collaboration with the Court of Cassation and the SDIF/TMSF, the state has not only punished judges for their independent rulings, but has also systematically overridden judicial processes through legislative and administrative means. The broad use of the Emergency Decree Law to liquidate companies without awaiting final judicial determination further underscores a pattern in which executive power directly intrudes upon and controls judicial outcomes.
Conclusion
The unfolding saga surrounding the Dumankaya decision is emblematic of a broader power struggle within the state apparatus. The removal of judges for their principled rulings—coupled with the unilateral state power to seize and liquidate companies as part of an anti-Gülen crackdown—reveals a judiciary that is increasingly vulnerable to political pressure. In this environment, judicial independence is not a given; even judges in the highest courts face severe risks of retaliation, highlighting an urgent need to reassess and reinforce the tenure, security, and autonomy essential to a fair legal system.
Background and Context
The Dumankaya case is set against the backdrop of a widespread crackdown against the Gülen Movement. As part of this anti-Gülen initiative, the Dumankaya Group was seized along with more than 1,000 other companies across the country. These seizures were executed under the pretext of terrorism-related charges, leading to a broad and far-reaching intervention by the state in the business sector and judicial proceedings alike.
Adding further to the state’s far-reaching intervention is the Emergency Decree Law that empowered the TMSF (now referred to as SDIF in its communications) to liquidate companies seized in terrorism-related cases without awaiting a final judicial decision. This power was exercised in the case of the Dumankaya Group companies. The SDIF’s Department of Subsidiaries and Real Estate issued a formal notice on February 27, 2018, regarding the liquidation of the seized companies. The notice—titled “Notice of Liquidation for Dumankaya Companies”—laid out the legal and procedural basis for liquidation, citing the relevant resolutions and articles of multiple laws (including Law No. 6758, Law No. 6578, and Law No. 5411).
The immediacy with which these measures were enforced—without waiting for a final legal decision—emphasizes the extent to which judicial procedures are being overridden by executive power in politically charged cases.
Categories: Turkey Human Rights Blog